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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-1970 
________________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
ANDREW WHITE, 
a/k/a Darnell White 
a/k/a F 
a/k/a Mikey F 
a/k/a Durrell 
aka Jerrell 
 
       Andrew White, 
        Appellant 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-08-cr-00161-002) 
District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 7, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge,  AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed February 7, 2017) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 In June 2010, Andrew White was sentenced to 196 months’ imprisonment 
following an armed robbery with two accomplices of a speakeasy.  He was convicted of 
Hobbs Act conspiracy and robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), use and carrying 
of a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and attempted 
witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).  He was later resentenced to 160 
months.  White challenges his sentence claiming that his Hobbs Act robbery conviction is 
not a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in light of Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  We disagree.1 
 In Johnson the United States Supreme Court invalidated the so-called residual 
clause contained in § 924(e) of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).  135 S. Ct. at 
2557.  It imposed a mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment on those who were in 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 1 White also contends his sentence is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b)(3), which 
provides that “[a]n individual found guilty of an offense shall be sentenced . . . to . . . a 
term of imprisonment as authorized by subchapter D [18 U.S.C. §§ 3581-85].”  He 
asserts that because his sentence exceeds that which is authorized for his particular felony 
under subchapter D, the mandatory minimum applied to his conviction under § 924(c) 
was unlawful.  This argument goes nowhere, as 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) provides that this 
authorization applies “except as otherwise specifically provided [by statute] . . . .”  
Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically has upheld § 924(c)’s mandatory minimum 
sentence.  See Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010).  
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possession of a firearm and who had been convicted of three or more “violent felonies,” 
which included crimes involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The Court determined that 
clause to be unconstitutionally vague.  
 White contends that the Court’s invalidation of § 924(e)’s residual clause similarly 
invalidates the residual clause contained in § 924(c).  That subsection imposes a sentence 
enhancement if a defendant uses a firearm during the commission of a “crime of 
violence,” which includes a felony that “involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.”  Id. § 924(c)(3)(B).  White asserts that he was improperly convicted under that 
provision of the ACCA because it is identically unconstitutionally vague, and therefore 
his Hobbs Act robbery conviction is not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of that 
provision.  We need not address that issue, however, because § 924(c) also defines a 
“crime of violence” as a felony involving “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another.”  Id. § 924(c)(3)(A). 
 Recently we addressed this issue in United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  There we held that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence within the 
meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A) because it involves a robbery “by means of actual or 
threatened force.”  Id. at 143-44 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1)).  Although Robinson 
dealt with a defendant who had brandished a firearm while committing the robbery—
rather than using or carrying a firearm, as White did—the concurrence noted that the 
underlying facts made no difference.  Id. at 151.  The Hobbs Act criminalizes a robbery 
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that involves use of “actual or threatened force”; § 924(c) imposes a sentence 
enhancement for the commission of a crime that involves “the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force” when the defendant also “uses or carries a firearm.”  
Accordingly, “[t]he definition of Hobbs Act robbery borrows conceptually, if not 
linguistically, from § 924(c)(3)(A)’s definition of ‘crime of violence.’” Id. at 144.  
 White was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery while using or carrying a firearm.2  
Thus his conviction stands under § 924(c)(3)(A), and we need not address his challenge 
to that statute’s residual clause.  We will affirm.3 
                                              
 2 White admits that during the robbery he was “armed with guns and ordered 
customers of the speakeasy to the floor taking money and cellular phones.”  Brief for 
White at 3. 
 
 3 White’s counsel has also filed a Petition to Withdraw as Counsel.  We agree with 
counsel’s assertion that, given the aforementioned discussion, there are no nonfrivolous 
issues for appellate review.  Because counsel has satisfied his requirements in moving to 
withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 378 (1967), we will grant 
his Petition.  
